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2001) 
A MATTER OF CLASS: THE IMPACT OF BROWN v. McLEAN 
ON EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE CASES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"We have seen the enemy and sometimes he or she works [or worked] 
for us."1 This may be the attitude that many employers have towards their 
former (litigious) employees as current and former employees file an in­
creasing number of employment discrimination claims each year.2 Con­
gress originally enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'.� (Title 
VII) to eliminate discriminatory hiring procedures, which prevented mi­
nority workers from enjoying equal employment opportunities.4 Today, 
however, the focus of Title VII has shifted from discriminatory hi ring 
1. Pamela R. Johnson & Julie Indvik, Rebels, Criticizers, Backstabbers, and Busy­
bodies: Anger and Aggression at Work, Pus. PERSONNEL MGMT., June 22, 2000, at 165. 
2. See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination: Moving Beyond 
McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination 
Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 660 ( 1998) (noting that employment discrimination 
suits constitute substantial part of all lawsuits); Johnson & Indvik, supra note 1, at 
165 (stating that current or former employees file one out of every five lawsuits 
nationwide); United States EEO C, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Chmges i'Y 
1992-fY 1999, availab/,e at http://www.eeoc.gov/ stats/vii.html (last modified Jan. 
12, 2000) (noting that approximately 57,600 Title VII charges filed with EEOC in 
1999 compared with 55,400 charges filed in 1992). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995). 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ( 1995) (noting that it is unlawful for employers 
to refuse to hire or discharge employee on basis of employee's protected attrib­
utes). The statute states, in pertinent part: 
Id. 
(a) Employer Practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
( 1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other­
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; .. .. 
The legislative history of Title VII also indicates that Congress' goal was to 
create equal employment opportunities. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 26 ( 1963), 
reJ!ri�ted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 240 1 (stating that Title VII's purpose is to 
ehmmate employment discrimination); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 800 ( 1973) (noting that purpose of Title VII was to create equal 
employment opportunities); E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: 
The Myth of the Protected Class in Tit/.e VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CoNN. L. R.Ev. 
441, 444 ( 1998) (noting Pl;1rpose .
of Title VII); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Dif 
ferent Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the 
McD.onnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CA.sE W. REs. L. REv. 53, 61 ( 1999) (staung that Congress' primary concern in enacting Title VII was "the relegation of 
Blacks to low-skill jobs"). 
(421) 
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claims to discriminatory discharge claims. 5 Despite this dramatic shift, 
the United States Supreme Court has never established the prima facie 
elements  that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must show.6 A"l 
a result, a dispute has arisen among the federal circuit courts over the 
relevancy of a plaintiff's replacement identity within the prim a facie frame­
work for discriminatory discharge cases. 7 
5. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changi.nK Nature of b11f1l<ry­
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 983 ( 1991 ) (" [T] oday the vast 
majority of all litigation suits challenge discrimination in discharge. Although the 
authors and early architects of employment discrimination laws envisioned them CL') 
tools for opening employment opportunities to blacks, women, and other minori­
ties, this is no longer their primary use."); see also Kenneth R. Gilberg, FmfJlU)·n� 
Must Protect Their Companies Against Empl<ryee Lawsuits, SUPERVISION, Nov. 1, 1992, at 
12 (noting increasing numbers of employees file wrongful discharge suit-; against 
their former employers). 
6. See Elizabeth Clack-Freeman, Comment, Tit/,e VII and Plair1tijj\ Hqlirlrrment: 
A Prima Facie Consideration, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 463, 469 ( 1998) (stating that Coun 
has never addressed what plaintiffs in discriminatory discharge cases must show so 
circuit courts had to define prima facie elements for discharge cases). The Su­
preme Court also established the proper order and allocation of proof for discrim­
inatory hiring cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 4 I I U.S. at 802-04 
(establishing burden-shifting system for employment discrimination cases). For a 
further discussion of the burden-shifting system, see infra notes 32-37 and accom­
panying text. The first step of the three-step system requires a plaintiff to establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802 (creat­
ing four elements of prima facie case). Although all federal courts have adopted 
the burden-shifting system and the prima facie case for discriminatory discharge 
claims, some courts have modified the prima facie elements. See BARBARA LINDE­
MANN ScHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN , EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 261-62 (David 
A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr. eds., 2d ed. Supp. 1989) (noting that courts 
apply burden-shifting system to discriminatory discharge claims but modify ele­
ments of prima facie case). In particular, courts tend to change the fourth ele­
ment of the prima facie case, in which the Supreme Court required a plaintiff 
alleging discriminatory hiring to show that the employer continued to seek appli­
cants to fill the plaintiff's position. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (requir­
ing plaintiffs in discriminatory hiring cases to show employer sought replacement); 
see also 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CooRDINATOR, 37, at 115 (2000) [hereinaf­
ter EMPLOYMENT] (noting courts have developed differing views on fourth 
element). 
7. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 490 ("Federal circuit courts continue to 
wrestle with discharge cases where the plaintiff has been replaced by someone 
from within his protected class."). Federal circuit courts have developed varying 
views regarding the replacement requirement. Compare Lowry v. Bedford County 
Sch. Bd., No. 98-1165, 1999 WL 507137, al *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (affirming 
grant of summary judgment because plaintiff failed lo show non-class replace­
ment), with Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 
2000) (requiring plaintiff to show only that position was not eliminated after dis­
charge). In Kendrick, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
�ole� that the Sup�eme Court has yet to a??ress the relevancy of a replacement's 
1denl1ty. See Kendnck, 220 F.3d al 1227 (c1tmg St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 528 n.l (1993) (Souter,J., dissenting)); see also Deborah C. Malamud, The 
Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2245 (1995) 
(stat�ng C:ourt did not �attempt to gi�e any meaningful guidance as to how the 
spec1ficat1on of the reqmred pnma fac1e proof would be determined for cases with 
other facts"). 
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In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green/'- the United States Supreme Court 
established the elements of a prima facie case, which a plaintiff alleging 
discriminatory hiring must show.9 In the absence of the Supreme Court's 
guidance, however, courts have encountered difficulties in applying this 
framework to discriminatory discharge claims. 10 For example, in Brown v. 
McLean, 11 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found 
that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, plaintiffs 
must show that their employers replaced them with individuals from 
outside of their protected class ("non-class replacement").12 Other fed­
eral courts, however, have expressly rejected this requirement, finding that 
this strict approach does not take into account employers who, attempting 
to avoid a discrimination suit, replaced the plaintiff with an individual 
from within the plaintiffs protected class ("same-class replacement") .13 
Several courts also have found that an employer may discharge an em­
ployee because the employee does not meet the employer's stereotypical 
image of a person from the employee's protected class.14 
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
9. See id. at 802 (stating plaintiff must show four elements to establish prima 
fade case) . The Suprem e  Court found that a plaintiff must show that he or she is a 
member of a protected class; that he or she applied for and was qualified for the 
job; that he or she was rejected and the position remained open and that the 
employer continued to seek applicants. See id. at 802 (listing elements of prima 
facie case of discriminatory h_iring) .  Although the Supreme Court initially stated 
the first element as requiring the plaintiff to show that he or she is a racial minor­
ity, the prima fade case arises regardless of whether or not they are a member of a 
traditional minority group. See HENRY H. PERRITT, jR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL AND 
PRACTICE§ 2.3 (1992) (stating that every person belongs to protected class) . 
10. See ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 261-62 ( noting courts apply vary­
ing modifications of prima facie elements) ;  Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stat­
ing court did not give guidance for application of framework in other contexts);  
Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 469 (stating courts apply prima facie elements dif­
ferently in discriminatory discharge cases); see also Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 
1126, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999) (examining varying applications of fourth element of 
prima facie framework in discriminatory discharge case) ;  Pivirotto v. Innovative 
Sys., Inc., 191F.3d 344, 354 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting varying interpretations of prima 
facie elem en ts in discriminatory discharge cases) . 
11. 159 F.3d 898 (4th Cir. 1998) . 
12. See id. at 905-06 (holding failure to show non-class replacement precluded 
plaintiff from establishing prima fade case) . For a further discussion of the Fourth 
Circuit's decision in Brown, see infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text. 
13. Su, e.g., Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating employer may hire same-class 
employee to avoid discrimination suit) ; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 
1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that employer may hire same-class replace­
ment to evade discrimination suits) ; see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6,  37, at 115 
(noting persuasiveness of argument that employers may hire same class replace­
ment to avoid litigation ) .  
14. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137 (stating non-class replacement require­
ment would preclude suits against "an employer who terminates a woman it nega­
tively perceives as a 'feminist' and replaces her with a woman who is willing to be 
subordinate to her male co-workers or replaces an African-American with an Afri­
can-American who is perceived to 'know his place"') ;  Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 
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This Note discusses the federal courts' viewpoints on the relevancy of 
a plaintiffs replacement identity in establishing prima facie cases of dis­
criminatory termination under Title VII.15 Part II of this Note discusses 
the United States Supreme Court's development of the prima facie frame­
work for discriminatory hiring cases and the federal courts' subsequent 
adaptation of that framework to discriminatory termination cases. 16 Part 
II also examines the varying circuit viewpoints on the relevancy of a plain­
tiffs replacement within this framework.17 Part III discusses the relevant 
facts of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brown v. McLean.18 Part IV ana­
lyzes and critiques the Fourth Circuit's improperly reasoned holding in 
Brown.19 Finally, Part V addresses the adverse impact of requiring a plain ­
tiff to prove that his or her replacement came from outside the plaintiffs 
protected class. 20 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE TITLE VII PRIMA F ACIE CAsE 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act") in response 
to persistent discrimination against minority groups in the United 
(rejecting non-replacement requirement because it precludes meritorious claims) . 
In Pivirotto, the Third Circuit reasoned that 
Id. 
[a] n employer's failure to hire someone of a different class from the 
plaintiff, after the plaintiff's discharge, could be explained in many ways . 
. . . [A] n employer may act on gender-based stereotypes, firing women it 
perceives as not feminine enough (or as too feminine) , or discharging 
women who are too aggressive while not doing the same to male 
employees. 
Commentators also have noted that an employer's stereotypes may play an 
important role in discharge decisions. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOY­
MENT D1scRIMINATION § 2.1 (2d ed. 1988) (stating employment decisions are often 
motivated by decision-makers' stereotypical attitudes); Hellen Hemphill & Ray 
Haines, Confronting Discrimination in Your Workplace, HR Focus, July 1, 1998, at S5 
(noting prevalency of stereotypical attitudes). 
15. For a discussion of the federal circuit courts' requirements regarding a 
plaintiff's replacement identity in Title VII discriminatory termination cases, see 
infra notes 38-85 and accompanying text. 
16. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's development of the discrimina­
tory hiring prima fade:; case, see infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. 
17. For a discussion of the federal courts' use of discriminatory hiring prima 
fade framework in Title VII discriminatory termination cases, see infra notes 38-85 
and accompanying text. 
18. For a discussion of the facts of Brown, see infra notes 86-99 and accompa­
nying text. 
19. For a discussion and analysis of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Brown, 
see infra notes 1 00-71 and accompanying text. 
20. For a discussion of the possible consequences of requiring a plaintiff who 
alleges Title VII discriminatory termination to show that his or her replacement 
was from outside the plaintiff's protected class, see infra notes 172-82 and accom ­
panying text. 
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States.21 Title VII of the Act, which specifically prohibits discrimination in 
the employment arena, was primarily enacted to create equal employment 
opportunities for African-American workers. 22 Title VII not only endeav­
ors to protect victims of discriminatory hiring procedures, it also protects 
21. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 
2393 (noting prevalence of discrimination against minority grou�
.
s, part��l�lady Al� 
rican Americans) ; see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 464 ( The Civil R1glm 
Act of l964 was passed in an attempt to bring the concept of equal rights into every 
spectrum of life. ") . For a discussion of discrimination in the United States prio� to 
the adoption of the Civil Rights Act, see ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA Luc:K GRA· 
HAM, THE SUPREME CouRT, RAcE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1995). 
22. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1995) (prohibiting employment discrimination) ;  
H.R. R.EP. No. 88-914, at 25, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (stating that 
purpose of Title VII was "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and infor­
mal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, re­
ligion, or national origin") ;  110 CoNG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement ?� S�n. 
Humphrey) ("The crux of the problem is to open employment opportumues for 
Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.") ; Ann C. 
McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilog;y: The Improper Use of Summm)' 
judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 210 (1993 )  (stating Con­
gress stressed equal employment opportunity is basic right when passing Title VII); 
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 4, at 60 (noting Congress' primary purpose in enact­
ing Title VII was to protect African-American workers from discrimination ) ;  see also 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979) (noting that 
Congress' primary concern in enacting Title VII was to create equal employment 
opportunities for African Americans) ; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (stating purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality of employ­
ment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory practices and devices which 
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority 
citizens") ; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (noting Congress 
never intended Title VII to proscribe discriminatory preference for any one 
group); Cunningham, supra note 4, at 444 (stating Title VII "was adopted as an 
attempt to address various persistent societal inequities") ; Michael ]. Zimmer & 
Charles A. Sullivan,  The Structure of Title VII Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation: 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination, and Burdens of Proof, 9 
�v. WOMEN's LJ. 25, 30 (1986) {stating Title VII was enacted to address discrim­
mauon against African American workers) .  For a general discussion of employ­
ment discrimination and congressional action prior to the adoption of Title VII, 
see generally PAUL BuRSTEN, DISCRIMINATION, JoBs, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 0PPORTUNI1Y IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL 
1�96 (1998) .  
In addition to Title VII, a plaintiff, claiming employment discrimination on 
the basis of the plaintiff's race may allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 
1983. See �2 _l.J .S.C: § 198l(a) (1981) (stating persons should have equal rights to 
cont�ct wit�m Umted States) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) (stating citizens  have rights 
to b�n� �ct�on under fed�ral laws) .  Section 1981 provides "[a]ll persons within 
the J�nsd1ct1on of the Umted States shall have the same right in every State and 
Temtory to make and enforce contracts . .. as is enj oyed by white citizens . . . . " 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (a) . Section 1981 only covers race or ethnic discrimination thus a 
plaintiff alleging a breach of an employment contract on the basis of hi; or her 
sex, .religion o� ag� �annot assert a claim under§ 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a) (stating that mmonues have same rights as white citizens) . Section 1983 does not 
create any rights, but rather is a vehicle for recovering a federal remedy for feder­
ally protect�d rights, such as those rights protected under § 1981. See 42 U .S.C. 
§ 1983 (staung persons may bring action for deprivation of rights under federal 
laws). Section 1983 states: 
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employees from being discharged because of their race, religion, sex, 
color or national origin.2� 
An employer violates Title VII by treating an individual less favorably 
than persons who do not possess the individual's protected trait.24 An 
employer also violates Title VII by implementing a policy that has a dispa­
rate impact on a group of people sharing a protected trait.�=· To state a 
claim of discriminatory termination successfully under Title VII, the plain­
tiff generally must prove disparate treatment by an employer.21; Because 
Congress did not provide a statutory framework of proof for disparate 
treatment cases, the United States Supreme Court developed a framework 
in McDonnell Douglas. 27 
Id. 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, [or] 
custom . .. subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in action at law . .. .  
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting and prirna facie element-; used in Title 
VII cases are also applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims. See ANDREW J. Ruz1c:110 ET 
AL., EMPLOYMENT D1scRIMINATION LITIGATION 2 (1989) (noting Title VII standards 
for proving discriminatory treatment are interchangeable with !:i 1981 ) .  
23. See 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (stating that it is unlawful for employers to dis­
charge employees because of race, sex, religion, color or national origin) .  In the 
past, most litigation involving Title VII attacked discrimination in hiring. See Don­
ohue & Siegelman, supra note 5, at 984 (noting majority of past Title VII litigation 
involved discriminatory hiring) .  Today, however, the overwhelming majority of 
Title VII litigation involves discriminatory termination claims. See id. (noting shift 
in litigation from discriminatory hiring to discriminatory discharge cases) ;  see also 
Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at xv (noting increase in wrongful termination 
cases). 
24. See Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (stating Title VII may be violated 
by disparate treatment) .  The United States Supreme Court defined disparate 
treatment in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. See 431 U.S. 324, 
335 n.15 (1977) . The Court stated that disparate treatment occurs when "[t]he 
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. " Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 
4, at 449 (defining disparate treatment); Drew S. Days, III, Reali!)', 3 1  SAN DIEGO L. 
RF.v. 169, 180 ( 1994) (same) . 
25. See Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 4  (stating Title VII may be violated 
by disparate impact) .  The Supreme Court defined disparate impact in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. See 431  U. S. at 334. The Court stated that 
disparate impact involves "employment practices that are facially neutral in their 
treatment but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot 
be justified by business necessity. " Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 4, at 449 
(defining disparate impact) ;  Days, supra note 24, at 180 (same) . 
26. See PERRITT, supra note 9, § 2.3 (stating that Title VII plaintiffs usually 
prove discriminatio� using disparate treatment theory); ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra 
note 6, at 594 (notmg overwhelming majority of discriminatory discharge claims 
are litigated under disparate treatment theory). 
27. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 450 (stating in McDonnell Douglas Su­
preme Cou:t �reated series of three shifting-burdens-of-proof for determining 
whether plamtiff has suffered employment discrimination in absence of statutory 
framework); see also St .  Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 ( 1 993) (stat-
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B. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: Development of the Title \'71 
Prima Facie Framework 
In McDonnell Douglas, the petitioner, McDonnell Douglas Corp., fired 
the respondent, a Black male, in an effort to reduce the company's total 
number of employees. 28 McDonnell Douglas subsequently advertised 
available positions for mechanics, the respondent's trade, and the respon­
dent applied for re-employment.29 After McDonnell Douglas refused to 
rehire the respondent, he sued McDonnell Douglas under Title VII, claim­
ing that he had not been rehired because of his race.30 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in MrDonnrll 
Douglas to clarify the proper order and nature of proof in Title VII individ­
ual disparate treatment cases.:�1 The Court held that a Title VII plaintiff 
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina­
tion.32 A plaintiff may fulfill this burden by showing: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli­
cants; (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications. 33 
ing in McDonnell Douglas Supreme Court developed order for presentation of 
proof in Title VII cases); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 
(1981) (noting Court set up allocations of proof and order of presentation of 
proof for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-
04 (creating burden-shifting system for Title VII disparate treatment cases). 
28. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794-96 (stating facts of case). Following 
the respondent's discharge, the respondent protested that his discharge and Mc­
Donnell Douglas' hiring practices were racially motivated. See id. at 794. The re­
spondent and other protestors illegally stalled cars on the road to McDonnell 
Douglas' plant, essentially blocking access to the plant. See id. The respondent 
also took part in a "lock-in," in which the respondent and other protestors placed a 
chain and padlock on the door to a McDonnell Douglas building, preventing em­
ployees from leaving. See id. 
29. See id. at 796. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. at 798, 800 (noting same). For a further discussion of the Supreme 
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas, see DAVIS & GRAHAM, supra note 21, at 240. 
32. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Cumpiano v. Banco Santan­
der P.R., 902 F. 2d 148, 153 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that Title VII plaintiff has 
burden of proving employer discriminated against plaintiff "for a proscribed rea­
son"); Cunningham , sufrra note 4, at 451 (stating that plaintiffs have initial burden 
of establishing prima facie case). In Cumpiano, the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
"critica.l determination in any Title VII suit is whether the complainant has proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that an impermissible consideration . .. 
was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse employment decision." Id. at 
155. 
33. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added). Court<; have inter­
pre_red the first element, which required the plaintiff to show that he or she is a 
racial minority, as requiring the plaintiff to show that he or she belongs to a pro­
tected class. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. , Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 
428 VIIJANOVA LAw REvrnw [Vol. 46: p. 421 
Further, the Court stated that, depending on a particular Title VII 
case's fact pattern, the framework might not be applicabie.:H Specifically 
developed for plaintiffs who lack direct evidence, the framework allows 
plaintiffs to present circumstantial evidence from which the court may in­
fer discrimination. �5 
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's termination.�6 After the employer fulfil ls this burden the 
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the em­
ployer's offered reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination and not 
the employer's true reasons for the plaintiff's discharge.:'\? 
(10th Cir. 2000) (requiring plaintiff to show he or she belongs to protected class 
for first prima fade element); Hogan v. Dixon, No. 98-1161, 2000 WL 9680:14, at*� 
(7th Cir. May 25, 2000) (same); Byers v .  Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.�d 419, 
426 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 98-116:1, 1999 
WL 507137, at *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (same); see al.so PERRrIT, rn/ml note 9. 
§ 2.3 (stating that every person belongs to protected class even if they are not tracii­
tional minority). 
34. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (uThe facts necessarily will \"ary 
in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required 
from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual 
situation."); see also Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stating Court did not gh·e 
guidance for application of framework in other contexts). For a further discussion 
of the applicability of the prima facie framework to discriminatory discharge cases, 
see infra notes 38-85 and accompanying text. 
35. See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(stating Supreme Court developed McDonnell Douglas framework because plaintiffs 
rarely have direct evidence); Cunningham, supra note 4, at 451 (stating Supreme 
Court developed prima facie framework for situations where there is no direct 
evidence). Examples of direct evidence include a key decisionmaker's pattern of 
racial slurs or racist conduct. See Ruz1cHo ET AL., supra note 22, at 17 (listing exam­
ples of direct evidence). Direct evidence may also include testimony of an em­
ployer or an employer's written policy, which treats employees who possess certain 
protected attributes differently than other employees who do not possess the attri­
bute. See job Discrimination, in 45C AM. juR. 2o § 2717 (1993) (noting possible ex­
amples of direct evidence in employment discrimination cases).  As commentators 
have noted, plaintiffs usually depend on circumstantial evidence to show that an 
employer discriminated against them because "few discriminators announce their 
bias." RUZICHIO ET AL., supra note 22, at 15. 
36. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In a later case, Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, the United States Supreme Court refined the burden­
shifting system and stated that the employer does not have to persuade the court 
that the employer's actions were motivated by the reasons offered. See Tex. Dep't 
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (explaining defendant's 
burden in employment discrimination cases). Instead, the employer only must 
"raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the employer." 
Id. 
37. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 
(stating plaintiff must demonstrate employer's proffered reason was not true rea­
son for employer's decision). In a later case, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the 
United States Supreme Court stated that " [ t] he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons 
put forward by the defendant . . . may, together with the elements of the prima 
fa�ie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). This interpretation of the final step in the bur-
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Since the Supreme Court developed the prima facie framework in 
McDonnell Douglas, a dispute has arisen in the federal courts over the 
proper application of the framework in discriminatory discharge cases.:�8 
Some commentators believe that this disagreement exists because the Su­
preme Court developed the framework in the context of a discriminatory 
hiring case and specifically allowed for flexibility in the application of the 
framework.39 In particular, courts disagree over the interpretation of the 
framework's fourth element, in which the Supreme Court required plain­
tiffs in discriminatory hiring cases to show that "the position remained 
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
[the] complainant's qualifications."40 In partic ular, the discrepancy cen­
ters on whether a plaintiff must show non-class replacement to establish a 
prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.41 As Justice Souter recog-
den-shifting system, however, has caused much controversy over what the Supreme 
Coun meant by indicating that disbelief of the employer's reasons may be enough 
to prove intentional discrimination. See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 2, at 666 (not­
ing criticism and controversy follow ing Court's decision in Hicks). 
38. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 469 (explaining circuit courts varied in 
adaptation of prima facie framework to discriminatory discharge cases); see also job 
Discrimination, in 45B AM. juR. 2o § 1 076 (1993) (examining differences in how 
courts view necessity of replacement requirement in Title VII prima fade cases). 
For a further discussion of the courts' adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas frame­
work to discriminatory discharge cases, see infra notes 39-85  and accompanying 
text. 
39. See Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (questioning whether McDonnell Doug­
las framework applies to discriminatory discharge cases); see also Clack-Freeman, 
supra note 6, at 469 (stating that circuit courts defined discriminatory discharge 
prima fade elements in absence of Supreme Court's guidance). I n  her article, 
Malamud noted the ambiguity created by the Court when it stated that the frame­
work was to be flex ible. See Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stating Court did not 
address how framework should be applied to Title VII cases). Malamud states: 
The Court did not . . . attempt to give any meaningful guidance as t o  
h�w the specification of the required prima facie proof would b e  deter­
mmed for cases with other facts-or even any guidance about what it 
meant for the "facts" to vary. Was the proof requirement set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas to apply to all failure-to-hire cases, with other standards 
to apply to cases involving discharges, promotions, and so on? . . . As a 
result McDonnell Douglas created a 'prima fade case' with a fixed legal 
consequence in litigation but the actual strength of the inferences that 
can be drawn from the prima facie case vary depending on the strength 
of the evidence that supports it. 
Id. at 2245-46. 
40. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 
1 1 26, 1 1 3�39 ( 10th �i� . 1999) (examining other courts' approaches to replace­
ment reqm�ement); P1vuotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191F.3d 344, 354 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1 999) (notmg courts have adopted differing approaches to fourth element); EM­
PLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 115 (noting courts' have differing views of fourth element in discriminatory discharge cases). 
41. Compare B�own v: �cLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1 998} (modifying frai:n�work to reqmre plamtiff to show replacement outside protected class), with Mem v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring plaintiff to show em-
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nized in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 42 the Court has never specifically 
addressed whether the identity of a plaintiffs replacement is a relevant 
consideration in Title VU discriminatory termination cases. 4:1 Therefore, 
the courts have developed varying rules concerning a plaintiffs 
replacement. 44 
Some courts simply apply the McDonnell Douglas framework withoul 
modifying the fourth element. 45 Other circuits, however, require plain­
tiffs to show non-class replacement and will automatically preclude plain­
tiffs from establishing a prima facie case if this burden is not met.46 Still 
other circuits list non-class replacement as a required element, but allow 
plaintiffs to overcome this requirement by showing additional evidence of 
discrimination.47 
ployer continued to seek replacement after plaintiffs discharg�). ComfmrP K�n­
drick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th ( .1r. 2000) (stating 
plaintiffs must show only that position was not eliminated), with Byers v. Dallas 
Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating plaintiff who 
does not show non-class replacement but provides additional evidence is not pre­
cluded from establishing prima facie case). 
42. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
43. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 n.l  (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating, "This court 
has not directly addressed the question whether the personal characteristics of 
someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material"); see also Kendrick, 220 
F.3d at 1227 (noting Supreme Court has not considered relevancy of plaintifrs 
replacements in discriminatory discharge cases); Perry, 199 F.3d at 1136 (recogniz­
ing that Supreme Court has not adopted requirement that plaintiff show replace­
ment was from outside protected class). 
44. For a discussion of the federal courts' treatment of the replacement re­
quirement in Title VII discriminatory discharge cases, see infra notes 47-85 and 
accompanying text. 
45. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1139 (noting that requiring plaintiff to show 
employer continued to seek applicants is superior standard to those followed in 
other courts); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (requir­
ing plaintiff to show that replacement continued to perform plaintiff's work after 
plaintiff's discharge); Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (requiring plaintiff to show employer attempted to fill plaintifls job 
with replacement); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (requiring plaintiff to show employer 
sought replacement for plaintiff); see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 4 70 (stat­
ing that majority of circuits adopted McDonnell Douglas framework without chang­
ing elements); EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 115 (noting several circuits hold 
that establishment of prima facie case does not depend on plaintifls replace­
ment). For a further discussion of circuits a pplying the McDonnell Douglas prima 
facie elements without alteration, see infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text. 
46. See Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. B d., 98-1165, 1999 WL 507137, at *2 
(4th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to show position filled by person outside pro­
tected class); Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (precluding establishment of prima facie case 
because plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement); see also EMPLOYMENT, supra 
note 6, 1 37, at 115 (noting Fourth Circuit requires plaintiff to show non-class 
replacement). For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's d ecision in Brown, 
see infra notes 100-71 and accompanying text. 
47. See, e.g. ,  Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(stating non-class replacement is not necessary); Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218 
F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding non-class replacement is not essential to 
establish prima fade case); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534 
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The federal courts that have adopted the McDonnell Douglas prima fa­
de framework without modification do not require plaintiffs to show non­
class replacement.48 Instead, these courts usually require the plaintiff to 
show that their position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek a replacement.49 
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
adopted this approach in Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, lnc./•0 holding that 
a plaintiff does not have to show non-class replacement.5 1  The Third Cir-
(llth Cir. 1984) (same) ; see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 1 1 5 (noting 
some courts hold that non-class replacement is not necessary if other factors raise 
inference of discrimination) ; Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 473-74 (stating some 
courts articulate fourth element as requiring plaintiff to show non-class replace­
ment but noting that these courts do not apply requirement strictly) . 
48. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc. ,  1 9 1  F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 1999) (stat­
ing that most circuits that have addressed the issue have found plaintiff is not re­
quired to prove that plaintiff was replaced by someone outside of protected class) ; 
see, e.g., Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 155 (1st Cir. 1 990) (stat­
ing plaintiff can fulfill fourth prong without showin g  replacement possessed pro­
tected attribute) ;  see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 1 1 5  (stating that 
several circuits have found that "Title VII case does not hinge on the plaintiffs 
replacement coming from outside the protected class"). 
49. See, e.g. , Sen�pta, 804 F.2d at 1 075 (requiring plaintiff to show "that his 
employer sought a replacement with qualifications similar to his own, thus demon­
strating a continued need for the same services and skills"); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 
(requiring plaintiff to show employer continued to seek applicants to fill position); 
see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 470 (stating that courts' simply adopting 
framework that requires plaintiff to show employer continued to seek replace­
ment) ; cf Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(stating plaintiff must prove discharge occurred under circumstances from which 
inference of discrimination based on membership in class can be drawn) .  
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has also held that a 
plaintiff must only show that the employer continued to seek applicants to fill the 
plaintiff's position. See Smith, 76 F.3d at 421 (stating plaintiff must show that "a 
comparably qualified person" continued to perform plaintiffs work after his or 
?er d�scharge); Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 2 1 ,  24-25 ( 1 st Cir. 1 994) ( agree-
1�g �� district court's ruling that plaintiff may establish prima facie showing of 
d1scnmmatory discharge by showing "position was filled by someone outside the 
protected group, or that 'the employer had a continued need for someone to per­
form the same work after [the complainant] left' " ) ;  Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 
348 n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting plaintiff must only show employer sought replace­
me�t .of "roughly equivalent qualifications") ;  Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 1 5 3  (stating plamuff must show "employer sought someone of roughly equivalent qualifications 
to perform substantially the same work") ;  Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 88 1 ,  899 
Ost Cir. 1988) (stating plaintiff only must show that "employer sought someone to 
perform the same work after he or she left") .  
50. 191 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 1999). 
51. See id.! at 357 (holding Title VII plaintiff does not have to show replace­
ment was outside protected class).  The Third Circuit reasoned that requiring a 
replacement to be outside the plaintiff's protected class would be inconsistent with 
th� �upreme Court's holding in McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 351 (stating that re­
qm�ng .non-class replacement would not be consistent with Supreme Court's rea­somng m. McDonnell Douglas). The Third Circuit reasoned that if the Supreme Court believed non-class replacement was essential, the Court would not have re-
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cuit relied, in part, on the United States Supreme Court ' s  decision in 
O'Connor v .  Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.52 In O 'Connor, the Supreme 
Court found that a plaintiff who alleges age discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is not required to show non­
class replacement.53 The Supreme Court reasoned that the ADEA pro­
tects individuals f rom discrimination, not classes of people.''4 Thus, ADEA 
plaintiffs must show only that they "lost out" because of their age, not be­
cause of their membership within the ADEA's protected class.''�' 
quired the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas to show that the employer hired a wh ite 
person . See id. (finding non-class replacement not required ) .  
52. 5 1 7  U.S. 308 ( 1 996) .  In O'Connor, a fifty-six year-old plain tiff brought an 
action under the ADEA, alleging that his employer had discharged him because of 
his age and replaced him with a forty-year-old individual. Sn' id. at 309. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that plaintiff had 
failed to establish a prima facie case because the employer replaced the plaintiff 
with a forty-year-old individual, a person who was within the plaintifrs protected 
class under the ADEA. See id. at 310 (discussing disposition of case in Fourth Cir­
cuit) . For a discussion of the ADEA, see infra note 53. 
53. See O 'Connor, 5 1 7 U.S. at 3 1 2  ( reversing Fourth Circuit's decision and 
holding that "the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the 
protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case"). 
The ADEA protects employees from employment discrimination on the basis of 
age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) ( l )  ( 1 994 ) . Section 623(a) ( l )  provides that " [ i]t shall 
be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual 
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 
Id. Although the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, the ADEA 
only protects those people who are forty years of age or older. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 631 (a) ( 1 994)  ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals 
who are at least 40 years of age." ) .  For a further discussion of the ADEA, see gener­
ally Annotation, Construction and Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 (29 U.S. C.A. §§ 621 et seq.), 24 A.L.R. FED. 808 ( 19 75 ) .  
54. See O'Connor, 5 1 7  U.S. at 3 1 2-1 3 ( reasoning that ADEA protects persons 
not classes) . 
55. See id. at 3 1 2  (rejecting consideration of plaintiffs replacement in ADEA 
cases) . Prior t o  t h e  Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor, the federal courts were 
sharply divided over whether a plaintiff i n  an age discrimination case had to show 
that his or her replacement was from outside of the plaintifrs protected class. See 
Guy D. Chappel III, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.: Broadening the 
Scope of Age Discrimination Claims Under the ADF.A, 20 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 2 1 1 ,  21 1-
12 (1996) (recognizing circuit split over whether plaintiff alleging age discrimina­
tion had to show replacement was under age forty) ; see also Bernard Mower, Age 
Discrimination: Supreme Court Agrees to Clarify Age Discrimination Elements of Proof, 1995 
DAILY LAB. REP. 2 1 9 (noting Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether ADEA plaintiff must show non-class replacement) . The Court, however, 
clarified that the ADEA prohibits age discrimination and does not prohibit dis­
crimination against employees who are aged forty and older. See O 'Connor, 5 1 7  
U.S. at 3 1 2  (reasoning plaintiffs replacement is irrelevant) . In particular, the 
Court stated " [ tJ he fact that one person i n  the protected class has lost out to an­
other person i n  the protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as h e  has lost out 
because of his age." Id. 
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The Third Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
O'Connor and found that the reasoning applied equally to T i tle VII cases.''li 
In addition, the Third Circuit stated that an employer may treat a female 
employee differently than similarly situated male employees, but may still 
replace the female employee with another female.57 Furthermore, the 
Third Circuit reasoned that an employer might hire someone from within 
the plaintiffs protected class to avoid a discrimination suit.c;8 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also simply 
adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework for discriminatory discharge 
cases."9 In Meiri v. Dacon,60 the Second Circuit reasoned that requiring a 
plaintiff to show non-class replacement was "at odds with the policies un­
derlying Title VII."61  Subsequently, the Second Circuit has defined the 
fourth element even more liberally, requiri ng the plaintiff to show "that 
his discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of dis­
crimination on the basis of his membership in that class. "6� 
56. See Pivirolto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 354-55 (finding guidance in O'Connor decision ) .  
The Third Circuit analogized Pivirotto's case to O'Connor and found that as long as 
the plaintiff "loses out" because of his or her protected attribute, the plaintiff's 
replacement is irrelevant. See id. at 355 (analogizing case to O'Connor) . 
57. See id. at 353-54 (noting that replacement from within protected class does 
not necessarily mean plaintiff was not treated differently from employees from 
outside plaintiffs protected class). The Third Circuit reasoned that employers 
may discharge an employee due to gender-based stereotypes. See id. at 355 (noting 
employer may fire women who are too aggressive but may not fire men who are 
aggressive). 
58. See id. (noting some employers may hire individual from within protected 
class to defeat discrimination suit) ; accord Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 
F.2d 1529, 1 535 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984) (noting employer may have hired same class re­
placement to avoid suit) . 
59. See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985) (adopting McDonnell 
Douglas framework without modification for discriminatory discharge cases) . In 
Meiri., the Second Circuit stated "the appropriate inquiry should be whether the 
employer continued to seek applicants to fill the position." Id. at 995; cf 
Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 92 F.3d 8 1 ,  9 1  (2d Cir. 1996) (finding prima 
facie case may be established in variety of ways) . In Chertkova, the Second Circuit 
stated that a plaintiff may fulfill the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas frame­
work by showing the employer continued to seek applicants to fulfill the position 
or by showing that "preferential treatment [was] given to employees outside the 
protected class" or by presenting "actions or remarks made by decision makers that 
could be viewed as reflecting a discriminatory animus." Id. For a discussion of the 
Second Circuit's subsequent interpretatio n  of the fourth prong, see infra notes 61-
62 and accompan}ing text. 
60. 759 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1985) . 
61. Id. at 996. The Meiri court stated that the McDonnell Douglas elements of 
proo� "were not intended to be 'rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.' Rather, they 
were mtended only to promote the general principle that a Title VII plaintiff must 
c�rry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to 'raise [ ] an inference of 
discrimination.' " Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Fumco Conslr. Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567, 577 ( 1 978 ) ) .  
62. Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) . The 
Second Circuit stated that a plaintiff could raise an inference of discrimination 
under the fourth prong by showing: ( 1 )  the employer continued to seek applicants 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion in its most recent case addressing the issue, Kendrick v. 
Penske Transportation Services, lnc.6"" In Kendrick, the Tenth Circuit found 
that a plaintiff must show only that the employer did not eliminate the 
plaintiffs position after the plaintiffs termination.'i4 To reach this con­
clusion, the Ten th Circuit relied on its reasoning in Perry v. Woodward.6" 
In Perry, the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected consideration of a plaintiffs 
for the plaintiffs position; (2) the employer criticized the plaintiffs perlormance 
in ethnically degrading terms; (3) the employer made "invidious comment-; about 
others in the e mployee's protected group;" (4)  the employer treated non-group 
members more favorably; (5) the sequence of events leading to the discharge was 
discriminatory; or (6) the timing of the discharge was discriminatory. Id. This 
interpretation of the fourth element appears to be controlling precedent within 
the Second Circuit. See, e.g. , Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 9 1  (2d Cir. 1 996) (stating that 
under fourth element plain tiff must show discharge occurred under circumstances 
giving rise to inference of discrimination ) ;  McKeever v. N.Y. Medical Coll. ,  No. 9&-
7066, 1999 WL 1 79376, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3 1 ,  1 999) (same) ;  Badrinauth v. Drey­
fus Serv. Corp . ,  No. 96-20 16, 1 998 WL 8 1 34 1 2, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1 998) 
(same) ; lvaniuc v. Hauer Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 94-5909, 1998 WL 57077, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5 ,  1998) (same) ;  Pappy v.  S. Beach Psych. Ctr. , No. 92-CV-5565, 
1 996 WL 1088901 ,  at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1 996)  (same) ; Cianfrano v. Babbitt, 85 1 
F. Supp. 4 1 ,  45 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1 994) (same) .  But see Budde v. H&K Distrib. 
Co. ,  No. 99-9449, 2000 WL 900204, at * 1  ( 2d Cir. June 29, 2000) (listing fourth 
element as requiring plaintiff to show that person not in protected class replaced 
plaintiff although element was not at iss ue ) ;  Lawson v. Getty Terminals Corp., 866 
F. Supp. 793, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating plaintiff may satisfy fourth element by 
showing that individuals from outside protected class either replaced plaintiff or 
were retained when plaintiff was terminated ) ;  see also Chin & Golinsky, supra note 
2,  at 663-64 ("Today, most Second Circuit decisions frame the fourth element as 
requiring the plaintiff to have suffered the adverse employment action under cir­
cumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination . " ) .  
63. 220 F.3d 1 220 ( 1 0th Cir. 2000) . 
64. See id. at 1 227 (stating plaintiffs must show position was not eliminated) .  
Before reaching this conclusion, the court examined Tenth Circuit precedent, 
which addressed the issue of a plaintiff's replacement. See id. at 1 227-29 (address­
ing Tenth Circuit precedent). The court noted that early holdings did not require 
the plaintiff to show non-class replacement. See id. at 1227 (same) .  The court also 
noted that some Tenth Circuit decisions listed the fourth prong as requiring the 
plaintiff to show that the plaintiff's replacement was of non-protected status. See id. 
at 1 228 (recognizing different standard applied i n  some cases) . The Tenth Circuit 
distinguished these decisions as dicta and, thus, not controlling precedent within 
the circuit. See id. at 1 228 (characterizing requirement as dicta) . The Tenth Cir­
cuit, however, did not address or distinguish its recent holding in Toth v. Gates 
Rubber Co., No. 99-1 0 1 7, 2000 WL 796068 ( 1 0th Cir. July 2 1 ,  2000 ) .  In Toth, the 
Tenth Circuit stated that a plaintiff may fulfill the fourth prong of McDonnell Doug­
las by showing: ( 1 )  treatment which was less favorable than treatment afforded to 
similarly situated employees; (2) replacement by someone outside the protected 
class; or (3) the position was not eliminated. See id. at *7 & n. 7 ( listing require­
ments for fourth prong) . The Toth court, however, found that the Yugoslavian 
plaintiff, who had alleged that her employer discharged her based o n  her national 
o�igin and/ or gender, had established a prima fade showing of discriminatory 
discharge because her employer replaced her with an Anglo male. See id. at *5, *7 
(stating plaintiff's allegations and finding plaintiff satisfied fourth element by 
showing she was replaced with Anglo male) . 
65. 199 F.3d 1 1 26 ( 1 0th Cir. 1999).  
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replacement as unfairly precluding suits by plaintiffs who may have legiti­
mate claims.66 The Tenth Circuit also rejected another common ap­
proach that requires plaintiffs to present additional evidence that leads to 
an inference o f  discrimination.67 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this 
approach resulted in too much uncertain ty for the district courts and for 
the parties.68 
2. Non-Class Replacement Is Not Essential if Additional Evidence Is Present 
Several federal courts list non-class replacement as an essential ele­
ment of the framework, but have held that a plaintiffs failure to show non­
class replacement does not automatically preclude establishment of a 
prima facie case.69 I nstead, these courts c onsider additional evidence 
66. See id. at 1 1 37 (stating strict replacement requirement would preclude 
meritorious suits) . The Tenth Circuit reasoned that an inflexible rule would 
preclude suits against employers who hire and fire minority employees in 
an attempt to prevent them from vesting in employment benefits or de­
veloping a track record to qualify for promotion . . .  [and] would also 
preclude a suit against an employer who terminates a woman it negatively 
perceives as a 'feminist' and replaces her with a woman who is willing to 
be subordinate to her male co-workers or replaces an African-American 
with an African-American who is perceived to 'know his place. '  
Id. 
67. See id. at 1 1 39 (finding that approach requiring plaintiffs to present addi­
tional evidence of discrimination is inferior) . For a further discussion of this ap­
proach, which requires additional evidence of discrimination when replacement is 
from the same class as the plaintiff, see infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text. 
68. See Perry, 199 U.S. at 1 1 39 (finding requirement of additional evidence is 
too uncertain ) .  The Tenth Circuit noted that courts adopting this approach have 
not explained what types of additional evidence would be sufficient to raise an 
inference of discrimination. See id. (noting courts have not provided examples of 
sufficient evidence) . The Tenth Circuit found that this lack of guidance c reated 
too much uncertainty. See id. (rejecting requirement of additional evidence) . 
69. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 473-74 (stating that some courts articu­
late fourth element as requiring plaintiff to show outside replacement but do not 
strictly enforce this element); see, e.g., Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 8 2  F.3d 
157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1 996) (stating plaintiff may be able to show discharge was 
result of protected attribute although employer hired same class replacement) . 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted this ap­
proach. See Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co. ,  218 F.3d 481 ,  485 (5th Cir. 2000) (stat­
ing replacement with non-member of protected class is not essential to 
�stablishment of discriminatory discharge prima fade case) ;  Byers v. Dallas Morn-
1�g News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419,  42�27 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that replacement 
With member of same protected class is outcome-determinative if plaintiff does not 
present other evidence of discriminatory intent) ; Nieto v. L&H Packaging Co.,  108 
F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that replacement with member of same 
p�ot�ct�d class �oes not preclude establishment of prima facie case of Title VII 
d1scnmmatory discharge) ;  Byrd v. Roadway Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 85, 86 ( 5th Cir. 
198�) . <.noting that replacement by member of protected class does not negate poss1b1hty that discharge was motivated by discrimination);Jones v. W. Geophysical 
Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating replacement of a minority 
�mployee with non-minority is not only way to create inference of discriminatory 
mtent) ; Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607 F.2d 1 153, 1 1 55 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding black 
employees established prima facie case of discriminatory termination because em-
436 V1u ANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol.  46: p. 42 1 
from which discrim inatory intent can be i n ferred.70 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seve nth Circuit adopted 
this approach i n  Canon v. Bethlehem Steel CmtJ.7 1  The court 1·easo11ed t hat 
the ultimate questi on in discrim inatory discharge cases is "whether the 
plaintiff has established a logical reason to belie\·e that  t h e  decision rests 
on a legally forbidden ground."n Thus, the court held t h a t  t h e  fact t h at a 
plaintiff's replacement is of "another race, sex, or age'' may raise an infer-
ployer replaced plaintiffs with white employees) ;  SfP alw Cla�·k-Frecman , \�1/m1 note 
6, at 473-76 (noting Fifth Circuit does not preclude cstahl 1sh rnl' n t  of p n m a  lane 
when plaintiff was replaced by member of plaintiffs protected class ) .  /J11t WP Singh 
v. Shoney's, Inc. ,  64 F.3d 2 1 7, 2 1 9  (5th Cir. 1 995) ( finding white fc m ak faikd _
to 
establish prima facie case of discriminatory discharge based on race becausc white 
female replaced her) ; Vaughn v. Edel, 9 1 8  F.2d 5 1 7, 52 1 ( :>th Cir-. 1 990) ( stating 
plaintiff must show that other employees who were non-members of plaintiffs pro­
tected class remained in similar positions) .  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also appears to 
have adopted this interpretation. See Davenport v. Riven:iew Gardens Sch. Dist. , 30 
F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 1 994) (stating plaintiff must demonstrate that discharge 
occurred in circumstances which allow court to infer discriminatio n ) ;  Walker '" St. 
Anthony's Med. Ctr., 881 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1 989) (same ) .  In Walkn� the 
Eighth Circuit stated that plaintiffs who are replaced by members of their pro­
tected class may still be able to establish that that they were the "object [s]  of imper­
missible discrimination." Id. The Eighth Circuit further reasoned that "the sex of 
[the plaintiffs] replacement, although a relevant consideration, is not necessarily 
a determinative factor in answer to either the initial inquiry of whether she estab­
lished a prima facie case or the ultimate inquiry of whether she was the victim of 
discrimination." Id. 
70. See EMPLOYJ\.1ENT, supra note 6, 1 37, at 1 1 5 (stating that plaintiff's replace­
ment is "a fact that must be considered in determining whether the claimant's 
ultimate burden of persuasion of intentional discrimination has been sustained, 
rather than whether a prima facie case has been established") ;  Clack-Freeman, 
supra note 6, at 4 78 (stating that these circuits c onsider the plaintiff's replacement 
in plaintiffs "overall attempt to prove discriminatory intent" ) ;  see also Perry', 1 99 
F.3d at 1 1 39 (stating that some circuits allow a plaintiff to establish prima facie if 
additional facts are shown from which inference o f  discrimination can be shown).  
71. 82 F.3d 1 5 7  (7th Cir. 1996) .  
72. Id. at 1 59. The Seventh Circuit further stated that " [a] n employee may be 
able to show that his race or another characteristic that the law places off limits 
tipped the scales against him, without regard to the demographic characteristics of 
his replacement." Id. at 1 58-59. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit 
relied on the Court's decision in O 'Connor. See id. (examining O'Connor) . The 
Seventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court's reasoning that "laws against dis­
crimination protect persons, not classes" is equally applicable to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Id. The Seventh Circuit utilized a hypothetical situation to demon­
strate O'Connor's applicability in Title VII cases: 
Id. 
Suppose an employer evaluates its staff yearly and retains black workers 
who are in the top quarter of its labor force, but keeps any white in the 
top half. A black employee ranked in the 60th percentile of the staff 
a
_
cc?rding. to supervisors' . evaluations is let  go, while all white e m ployees similarly situated are retamed. This is race discrimination, which the em-
ployer cannot purge by hiring another person of the same race later. 
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ence of discrimination ,  but non-class replacement is "neither sufficient or 
necessary. "73 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also has 
held that a same-class replacement does not automatically preclude a 
plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case.74 The Eleventh Circuit origi­
nally adopted this approach in a discriminatory hiring case, Howard v. 
Roadway Express, Inc.75 In Howard, Roadway Express refuse d  to h i re the 
plaintiff, a black man and former part-time employee of the company, for 
permanent em ploymen t.76 The following year, Roadway Express hired a 
black man to fill the position for which the plaintiff had applied.77 The 
Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff was not precluded from establish­
ing a prima facie case, reasoning that plai n tiffs can raise an inference of 
discrimination in other ways.78 The Howard court indicated that there 
might be an i n ference of discrimination because of a substantial lapse of 
time between the plaintiff's application and the subsequen t  hiring.79 In 
addition, the Howard court stated that because Roadway hired a same-class 
replacement after the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunities Commission , the hiring could have been motivated by 
the filing of the complaint, and thus, discrimination could still be 
inf erred. 80 
3. Courts Considering Non-Class Replacement an Essential E/,ement 
A small minority of federal courts have adopted a strict approach to 
the consideration of a plaintiffs replacemen t  identity.8 1  In these courts, 
the plaintiff is automatically precluded from establishing a prima facie 
73. Id. at 5 1 9; see also Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 4 8 1 ,  485 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (" [I] t is well settled that, although replacement with a non-member of 
the protected class is evidence of discriminatory intent, it is not essential to the 
establishment of a prima facie case under Title VII." ) .  
74. See, e.g. , Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll. ,  4 9  F.3d 15 1 7, 1 52 1  ( 1 1 th Cir. 
1995) (stating plaintiff must show replacement outside protected class under 
fourth element but finding "prima facie case is n o t  wholly dependant upon meet­
ing the fourth requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test" ) .  
75. 726 F.2d 1 529 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984 ) .  
76. See id., at 1534 (describing facts o f  case ) .  
77. See id. 
. 78. See id. (" [P] roof that the employer replaced the fired minority employee Wlth a non-minority employee is not the only way to create such an inference [of 
unlawful discrimination ] . "  (quoting Jones v. Western Geophysical Co. of Am. , 669 F.2d 
280, 284 (5th Cir. 1 982) ) ) .  
. _
79. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (noting "the lapse of eleven months would 
s1gmficantly diminish the reliability of the subsequent hiring as an indicator of 
Roadway Express' intent at the time it rejected [the plaintiffs] application") . 
80. See id. (stating inference of discrimination cannot be ruled out based on 
circumstances of case ) .  
8 1 .  See, e.g. , Lowry v .  Bedford County Sch .  Bd., No. 98-1 165, 1 999 WL 5071 37, 
at *2 (4th Cir. 1 999) ( requiring plaintiff to show position filled by person outside 
prote�ted class) ;  Br.own v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1 998) ( precluding establishment of pnma fade case because plaintiff failed to show non-class replace-
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case of discriminatory termination if the plaintiff fails to show that his or 
her replacement is from outside of the plaintiff's protected class.82 The 
United States District Court for the Distri c t  of Columbia adopted this rea­
soning in Kkin v. Derwinski.83 In that case, the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia stated that a n  employee alleging discrimina­
tory discharge must show that a person from outside the employee's pro­
tected class filled the employee ' s  positio n ,  or that an e mployee from 
outside the protected class with comparable experience was not termi­
nated.84 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
adopted a similar requirement in Brown v. McLean.8:; 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF BROWN \ '. Mc:LJ-:.4.:V 
According to the Fourth Circuit's opi n i on in Brown, the plaintiff, Ron­
ald A. Brown ,  a white male, was employed as the City of Baltimore's Ad­
ministrator of Telephone Facilities.86 On December 3, 1 99 1 , Jacqueline F. 
McLean, a black female, took office as the City of Baltimore 's Comptroller 
and Brown 's supervisor.87 Upon taking office, McLean criticized the lack 
ment) ; Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 ( D . D .C. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to 
show non-class replacement) . 
82. See, e.g. , Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (stating that plaintiff failed to establish 
prima fade case because plaintiff could not show non-class replacement) ; Lowry, 
1999 WL 5071 37, at *2 (finding that plaintiff did not establish prima facie case 
because plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement) ;  see also Clack-Freeman, 
supra note 6, at 479-80 (stating that in United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia, plaintiffs who fail to show non-class replacement are precluded from 
establishing prima facie case) . 
83. 869 F. Supp. 4 (D .D.C. 1994) . 
84. See id. at 4 ( stating criteria for establishing prima fade case of religious 
discrimination) .  In Klein, a Jewish employee alleged that her employer, the De­
partment of Veteran Affairs, had terminated her based on her religion. See id. at 
5-8. The court noted that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case had been 
adapted for use in discriminatory termination cases and stated that under the 
fourth prong o f  the framework the plaintiff must prove that "she was either re­
placed by a person not in the protected class, or such a person with comparable 
qualifications and work records was not terminated." Id. at 7; see also Simens v. 
Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1 997) (holding plaintiff must show replacement 
outside protected class in disparate treatment cases) . After the plaintiff's dis­
charge, another Jewish employee took over the responsibilities of the plaintiffs 
position; thus the court found that the plaintiff failed to show that someone 
outside of her p rotected class filled the position .  See Kl.ein, 869 F. Supp. at 8 (find­
ing plaintiff did not meet her burden under McDonnell Douglas prima fade frame­
work) . In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff had failed to allege that her 
employer had refused to fire a non:Jewish person who held a similar position as 
the plaintiff and who had a similar work performance as the plaintiff. See id. at 8-10 
(same) . 
85. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown, see infra 
notes 1 00-71 and accompanying text. 
86. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 900 (stating facts of case) .  As the Administrator of 
Telephone Facilities, Brown was responsible for directing the city government's 
telephone services. See id. 
87. See id. 
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of diversity in the office.88 In particular, McLean complained that the of­
fice portraits were exclusively of white males and had the portraits re­
moved from the office.89 
On December 1 8, 1 99 1 ,  McLean's transition team issued a report sug­
gesting that the municipal post office and telephone department be com­
bined into one department under one manager's supervision .9° McLean 
sent the recommendation to Baltimore 's Board of Estimates, of which Mc­
Lean was a voting member.9 1 On May 1 3, 1 992, the Board of Estimates 
issued its budget recommendations, which included eliminating Brown's 
position and adding a new position: the Di rector of Communications 
Services. !l2 
On May 24, 1 992, Brown received a letter from McLean, i nforming 
him that his position was being eliminated.93 On July 1 ,  1 992, Rochelle 
Young, a black man, was provisionally appointe d  and, subsequently pe rma­
nently hired, to fill the newly created Director of Commu nications Ser­
vices position.94 
On February 7, 1 995, Brown filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland against McLean, the Mayor and the City 
of Baltimore under Title VII.95 Brown claimed that his position had been 
88. See id. (stating facts of case) .  
89. See id. 
90. See id. (noting transition team's recommendations) .  The report stated 
that "the restructuring would 'use present personnel on board ' and [would] ' take 
maximum advantage of proven personnel capabilities."' Id. at 901 .  
91 . See id. at 90 I .  
92. See id. 
93. See id. The letter stated that the elimination of Brown's position was not 
Brown's fault and stated that the position was being eliminated based on McLean's 
transition team's recommendations. See id. (noting contents of termination 
letter) . 
. 94. See id. (stating Young was provisionally appointed to newly created posi­
tion and began working in Brown's old office) . Prior to Brown's departure, Brown 
met with McLean for an exit interview, during which time Brown told McLean that 
he was going to apply for the Director of Communications Services position. See id. 
!he Baltimore City Regulations require that any person, whose position is abol­
ished, be placed on a re-employment list for a position that "most nearly approxi­
mate (s] the position abolished." Id. Under the Baltimore City Regulations, a 
person on the re-employment list takes priority over any other person who may 
apply for the position. See id. (describing city regulations) . Brown, however, was 
not placed on the list for the Director of Communications Services position. · See id. 
(stating there is conflicting evidence about why Brown was not placed on re-em­
ployment list for Director of Communications Services position) .  Instead, Brown 
w� placed on the re-employment list for the position of Telephone Supervisor, for 
whJCh there was no vacancy. See id. The Telephone Supervisor is a working tele­
phone operator, which requires a high school education, whereas Brown had an 
M.B.A. and no experience as a switchboard operator. See id. The Director o f  Com­
mun
.
ications Services position was advertised in the newspaper, but Brown never 
app
_
h�d for the position. See id. (stating there was open application process for 
pos1t1on) .  
95. See id. at 898, 901 (recounting disposition of case) . 
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eliminated and he had been discharged because of his gender.HH The dis­
trict court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Brown's claim of discriminatory discharge based on gender.�17 The district 
court reasoned that because a male filled the Director of Communications 
Services position, Brown had not been a victim of gender discrimination.98 
Brown appealed the court's decision and requested that the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit find that the district court 
erred in granting sum mary judgment against him on his gender discrimi­
nation charge.99 
96. See id. at 898, 901 (noting claims in district court) . Brown also alleged a 
violation of his equal protection rights under 42 U .S.C. §§ 198 1 and 1 983, as well 
as race discrimination under Title VII. See id. at 90 1 .  The district court also 
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of unlawful 
discrimination in the elimination of Brown 's position. See id. 901-02. The court 
refused to grant summary judgment on Brown 's failure to hire claim, finding that 
there was a genuine question of material fact that Brown was not hired because of 
his race. See id. The court denied Brown 's motion for summary judgment in 
which Brown had argued that the city's affirmative action claim constituted a race 
and gender based employment policy in violation of Title VII and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See id. The case went to trial on Brown 's Title VII failure-to-hire 
claim and on Brown's § 1981 and § 1 983 claims against the city. See id. at 902. The 
court granted the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Brown 
had not produced sufficient evidence that there was a violation of § 1981  and 
§ 1983, and that Brown did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. 
See id. 
97. See id. at 901-02 (noting disposition of case in district court) . The defend­
ants also claimed that the plaintiff had not been unlawfully discriminated against 
by the elimination of his position as the Administrator of Telephone Facilities. See 
id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on 
this claim. See id. The defendants also claimed that they were entitled to summary 
judgment based on the plaintiffs inability to show that he was not hired for the 
Director of Communications Services because of his race. See id. The district court 
refused to grant summary judgment o n  this claim, finding that the plaintiff had 
established a genuine issue of material fact that he was not hired for the position 
because of his race. See id. (noting district court's ruling on failure to re-hire 
claim).  
98. See id. (recounting district court's reasoning). 
99. See id. at 905 (noting basis for appeal ) .  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit also 
affirmed the district court's finding that Brown had not established a prima fade 
case of failure-to-hire and affirmed the denial of partial summary judgment on 
Brown's claim that the city's affirmative action plan constituted a race or gender­
based employment policy. See id. (noting circuit ruling) . The dissent, however, 
argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment on Brown 's Title VII 
race discrim.ination cla�m shoul� .be reversed. See id. at 906. In support of its argu­
ment, the dissent provided add1uonal evidence indicating discrimination, further 
noting tha� by �he time McLean left office there were no Caucasians and only one 
male workmg m the Comptroller's office. See id. at 906-08 (stating additional 
facts) . 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FouRTH CIRcun's HOLDING IN BROWN v. McLEAN 
A. Narrative Analysis 
1 .  Requiring Replacement Outside Protected Class 
The Fourth Circuit initiated review of Brown's gender discrimination 
claim by stating that " [i]  n order to make out a prima facie case of discrimi­
natory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the position was 
ultimately filled by someone not a m ember of the protected class." 1 00 In 
reaching this proposition, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in 
Hicks, as well as the district court's decision i n  Klein, as examples of cases 
in which courts required plaintiffs to show non-class replacements. 10 1 
2. The Fourth Circuit Notes There Are Exceptions 
The Fourth Circuit, however, noted that t here were three distinct ex­
ceptions to the non-class requirement. 102 First, the court listed the Su­
preme Court's decision in O'Connor as a n  exception. 103 The Fourth 
Circuit stated that age discrimination cases like O 'Connor, in which an em­
ployer replaces the plaintiff with a significantly younger person from 
within the plaintiffs protected class are exceptions to the replac ement re­
quirement.104 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not address this excep­
tion in its analysis of Brown's claim. 1 05 
The second exception the Fourth Circuit discussed was cases in which 
there has been a significant length of time between the plaintiffs applica­
tion for employment and the employer's hiring of another individual 
within the same protected class. 106 In support of this exception, the 
Fourth Circuit noted the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Howard, in which 
the Eleventh Circuit stated that a significant p eriod of time between the 
employer's rej ection of the plaintiff and the e mployer's subsequent h iring 
of a same-class replacement does not eliminate an inference of discrimina-
100. Id. at 905. 
101. See id. at 905 (citing St. Mary 's Honor Ctr. v .  Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 
(1993); Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) ) .  
. 102. See id. at 905 (stating that courts have noted exceptions in limited situa­
�1ons). In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioners were not challeng­
mg t.he district court's finding that the respondent established a prima facie showing by proving that a white man ultimately filled the respondent's position. 
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (stating that establish­
ment of prima fade case was not being questioned) . 
103. See B rown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (citing O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 
517 U.S. 308 (1996) (listing exceptions to non-class requirement) ) .  
104. See id. at 905 (stating that courts may find exceptions where employers 
replace plaintiffs with younger persons within same class) . 
105. See id. at 906 (finding none of exceptions were applicable and beginning 
analysis with second exception) . 
. �06. See. 
�d. (finding that significant lapse of time between application and 
rehmng declSlon would create exception to non-class replacement requirement) . 
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tion.107  In addressing this exception, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
even if Brown had applied for the Directo r  of Communication s  Services 
position, the length of time between Brown 's application and the city's 
hiring of another male would not have been significant enough to place 
Brown within the second exception. 1 08 
The final exception that the Fourth Circuit noted was an employer's 
hiring of a same-class replacement that is in tended to mask the e m ployer's 
discrimination against the plain tiff. 1 09 The Fourth Ci1-cuit examined this 
exception and found that Brown had n o t  presented any evidence that in­
dicated that the city intended to disguise gender discrimi nation against 
Brown by hiring another male. 1 10 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that 
Brown failed to establish a prima facie sh owing of discriminatory dis­
charge and affirmed the district court's grant of motion for sum mary 
judgment. 1 1 1  
B. Critical Analysis 
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown is inconsistent with the conclu­
sions reached by all other federal circuit courts that have addressed the 
issue. 1 1 2 The court's inconsistent holding may stem from the manner in 
which the court a nalyzed Brown 's claim. 1 1 3 The court set forth a rule stat­
ing that the plaintiff must show his employer hired a non-class replace-
107. See id. (citing Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. , 726 F.2d 1 529 ( 1 1 th Cir. 
1 984) ) .  For a further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Howard, see 
supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
1 08. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 906 ("Even if Brown had applied for the DCS posi­
tion, the city hired another male for the position at the same time that Brown 
would have been considered for the position." ) .  
109. See id. at 905 (noting an exception to non-class replacement requirement 
is created "where the employer's hiring of another person within the protected 
class is calculated to disguise its act of discrimination toward the plaintiff') . 
1 1 0. See id. at 906 (stating that evidence presented was not sufficient to estab­
lish that city was attempting to mask discrimination by hiring another male ) .  
l l  l .  See id. at 906. 
1 1 2. Compare Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (requiring plaintiff to show non-class re­
placemen t) , with Williams v. Trader Publ 'g Co., 2 1 8  F.3d 481 ,  485 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(finding non-class replacement is not essential to establish prima facie case) ,  Car­
son v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 1 59 ( 7th Cir. 1996) (stating non-class 
replacement is not necessary) , Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 4 1 3, 4 2 1  ( 1 st 
Cir. 1996) (requiring plaintiff to simply show replacement continued to perform 
plaintiffs work after plaintiff's discharge),  Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 
F.2d 1072, 1 075 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring plaintiffs to show simply that employer 
sought replacement for plaintiff) , Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(requiring plaintiffs to show employer sought replacement for plaintiff) , and How­
ard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1 529, 1 534 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984) (finding non­
class replacement is not necessary). 
1 1 3. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Brown, see 
infra notes 1 18-71 and accompanying text. 
2001] NOTE 443 
ment and then listed three exceptions to the rule. 1 1 4  Although the court 
cited specific cases to support the rule and its exceptions, the court did 
not analyze the reasoning in these cases. 1 15 In addition, unlike other fed­
eral circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit did not address the purpose of Title 
VII and the purpose of the prima fade case. 1 1 6  As a result, the court 
reached an inconsistent result. 1 1 7 
1.  Deve!,opment of Non-Class R£placement Requirement Rests on Possibly 
Flawed Reasoning 
The Fourth Circuit erroneously cited the Supreme Court's decision in 
Hicks as providing the applicable law for interpretation of the fourth ele­
ment of the prima facie framework. 1 18 In particular, the Fourth Circuit 
cited Hicks as requiring Title VII plaintiffs to show non-class replace­
ment. 1 19 The Supreme Court in Hicks, however, did not address whether 
a plaintiff must show non-class replacemen t because the plaintiff's estab­
lishment of a prima fade case was not at issue i n  Hicks. 1 20 In fact, the 
dissent in Hicks expressly stated that the Supreme Court has never ad­
dressed the relevancy of a plaintiff's replacement i n  the context of a dis­
criminatory discharge case. 1 2 1  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on 
114. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (stating that plaintiff must show non-class re­
placement to establish prima fade case and stating that there are three exceptions 
to the requirement) . 
1 1 5. See id. at 905-06 (citing other federal circuit cases as examples of Fourth 
Circuit's list of exceptions, but not analyzing reasoning of these cases) .  
1 16. See id. at 905-06 (failing to address underlying policy and purpose of 
prima fade case and of Title VII ) .  Federal circuit courts that have addressed the 
purposes of Title VII and of the Title VII prima fade cases have adopted more 
lenient approaches than the Fourth Circuit's strict non-class replacement require­
ment. See, e.g., Mei.Ti, 759 F.2d at 996 (noting purpose of Title VII and prim a  facie 
case and adopting McDonnell Douglas framework in its original form).  In Meiri, the 
Second Circuit stated that the non-class replacement requirement was "at odds 
with the policies underlying Title VII." Id. The court further noted the flexibility 
of the prima fade elements. See id. (stating that prima fade elements were not 
intended to be applied rigidly) . 
1 1 7. For a further discussion of the inconsistency of the Fourth Circuit's hold­
ing, see infra notes 1 18-71 and accompanying text. 
1 18. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 ("In order to make out a prima fade case of 
discriminatory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the position ulti­
mately was filled by someone not a member of the protected class." (citing St. 
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U .S. 502 (1993) ) ) .  
1 19. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (citing Hicks as requiring plaintiff to show non­
class replacement requirement) . 
120. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (stating 
" [p] etitioners do not challenge the District Court's finding that respondent satis­
fied the minimal requirements of such a prima fade case " ) . After noting that the 
plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case was not at issue, the Court proceeded 
to quote the district court's prima facie elements. See id. In the district court's 
opinion, it stated the fourth element as "the position remained open and was ulti-
. mately filled by a white man." Id. 
121.  See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 n.l ( 1993) (Souter, ]. ,  dissenting) ("This court 
has not directly addressed the question whether the personal characteristics of 
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Hicks resulted in the application of an improper standard to Brown 's dis­
criminatory discharge claim. 1 22 
The Fourth Circuit also cited the district court's holding in Klein as 
supporting the replacement requirement. 1 2:-\ Although the district court 
did hold that a plain tiff must show non-class replacement, the court's 
holding directly confl icts with the approaches adopted by all federal cir­
cuit courts of appeal that have addressed the issue. 1 24 For exam ple, so me 
federal courts-i ncluding the Second,  Ten th and Third Circuit'i-do not 
look at a plain tiffs replacement, but instead require a plaintiff to show 
either that the employer continued to seek a replace ment for the plai ntiff, 
or that the discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference 
of discrimination . 1 25 Other circuits that have addressed the issue do con­
sider a plain tiff's replacement, but unl ike the Kl.ein court, these circuit 
courts do not preclude a plaintiff who fails to show non-class replacement 
from establishing a prima facie case if the plain tiff can provide other evi­
dence of discrimination . 1 26 Thus, although the Fourth Circuit correctly 
cited Klein as imposing a strict replacement requirement on Title Vl l 
plaintiffs atte mpting to establish a prima facie case of discri mination re­
sulting from their termination, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Klein 
caused the court to adopt an approach that varies from the approaches 
adopted by all other circuit courts. 1 27 
someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material, and this issue is not 
before us today." ) .  
122. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's erroneous reliance on Hicks, see 
supra notes 1 1 8-2 1 and accompanying text. 
123. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (citing Klein in support of non-class replace­
ment requirement) . 
124. Compare Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1 994) (requiring 
plaintiff to show non-class replacement) , and Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8 
(D.D.C. 1997) (same ) ,  with Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Corp. ,  220 F.3d 1220, 
1 228 ( 1 0th Cir. 2000) ( holding plaintiff must show employer did not eliminate 
position after plaintiff's discharge) ,  Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 
1 48, 153 ( 1 st Cir. 1 990) (finding plaintiff must show only employer sought replace­
ment), and Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc. ,  1 9 1 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999) ( hold­
ing replacement requirement is "inconsistent with Title VII") .  
125. See, e.g. ,  Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1 229 (stating plaintiff must raise inference 
of discrimination to establish prima fade case of discriminatory discharge);  
Pivirotto, 191 F. 3d at  356 ( requiring plaintiff to show circumstances that give rise to 
inference of discrimination in order to establish prima facie case of discriminatory 
discharge) ;  Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring plaintiffs 
to show employer sought replacement for plaintiff) . 
126. See, e.g. , Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 4 1 9 ,  426-27 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that same-class replacement is outcome-determinative if plain­
tiff does not present other evidence of discriminatory intent) ; Carson v. 
Bethelehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 1 58 ( 7th Cir. 1996) (stating plaintiff may be 
able to show that discharge was result of protected attribute although employer 
hired same-class replacement) ; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. ,  726 F.2d 1 529, 
1 534 (stating that non-class replacement is not only way to establish prima facie 
case) . 
127. See Klein, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1 994) (requiring plaintiff to show 
non-class replacement to establish prima fade case ) .  But see Clack-Freeman, supra 
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2. Misapplied Reasoning Leads to Hawed L ist of Exceptions 
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Another example of the Fourth Circuit' s  misguidance is its interpreta­
tion of the list of exceptions. 1 '.!8 First, the court incorrectly applied the 
Supreme Court's O 'Connor decision as a unique exception for age discrimi­
nation cases. 1 �9 Because the Supreme Court's decision in O 'Connor in­
volved the ADEA, not Title VII, other circuit courts that have examined 
the decision in the context of Title VII do not view it as an exception to 
the replacement requirement. 1 'w Instead, many federal courts rely on the 
decision as supporting the proposition that Title VII protects individuals 
from discrimination, but does not protect classes of people from discrimi­
nation.1 3 1  Thus, these courts rely on O 'Connor in arguing that a plaintiffs 
replacement should not be the sole criteria in determining whether a 
plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of discriminatory termina­
tion.132 For example, the Third Circuit in Pivirotto argued that the Su­
preme Court's reasoning in O 'Connor applied equally to Title VII and 
stated that a Title VII plaintiff must show that he or she "lost out" because 
of a protected trait. 1 33 Additionally, in Carson, the Seventh Circuit relied 
note 6, at 469 ( stating most courts either simply adopted McDonnell Douglas frame­
work or do not strictly enforce non-class replacement requirement) ; see also Perry•, 
199 F.3d at 1 1 38-39 (summarizing circuits' adoption of lenient approach to re­
placement requirement) . In examining other circuits' approaches to the replace­
ment requirement the Tenth Circuit found: 
Id. 
&veral circuits . . .  have held that a plaintiff can satisfy the prima facie 
burden without proving that the position was filled by an individual who 
does not share the protected attribute. Some circuits have concluded 
only that a plaintiff is not precluded from meeting the prima facie bur­
den by an inability to demonstrate that the replacement employee does 
not share [his or] her protected attribute. 
128. For a critique of the Fourth Circuit's list exceptions, see infra notes 1 29-
59 and accompanying text. 
129. See Brown v. McLean, 1 59 F.3d 898, 905 9th Cir. 1998) (citing O'Connor 
as example of age discrimination exception ) .  
. _ 130. See, e.g., Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 (examining O'Connor decision and us­mg 1t to support argument in Title VII discriminatory discharge case ) ;  Carson, 82 
F.3d at 1 58 (same) .  
131 .  See Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 (stating O'Connor reasoning applies i n  gen­
der and race context); Carson, 82 F.3d at 1 58 (stating discrimination laws protect 
people not classes) .  
. 132. See :ivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning "ap­plies equally m gender or race context: 'The fact that one person in the protected 
cl�ss has l_ost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant [ to the pnma fac1e case] ,  so long as [s] he has lost out because of [her gender] "' (quoting 
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 1 7  U.S. 308, 3 1 2  ( 1 996) ) ) ;  Carson, 8 2  F.3d 
a� 1 5_8 �stating that Supreme Court's reasoning is equally applicable to Title VII dtscnmmatory discharge cases) . 
133.  See Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 (rejecting non-class replacement require­
ment after examining and adopting O'Connor reasoning) . The Third Circuit 
found that proof of discrimination should not be limited to fact that plaintiff was 
or �as. not r�placed by someone from outside his or her protected class. See id. (rejectmg stnct non-class replacement requirement) . 
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on the Supreme Court's reasoning that " ( l ]aws against discrimination pro­
tect persons, not classes" to find that Title VII plaintiffs are not required to 
show non-class replacement. 134 
If the Fourth Circuit had applied the Supreme Court's reasoning as 
the Third Circuit did in Pivirotto or as the Seventh Circuit did in Carson, 
the Fourth Circuit may have held that a plaintiffs replacement is an irrele­
vant consideration in the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimina­
tory discharge. 1 35 Because the Fourth Circuit classified O 'Connor as an 
exception to the replacement requiremen t  for ADEA cases, its reasoning is 
inconsisten t  with the reasoning of courts that have addressed the same 
issue. 1 :-16  As a result, the Fourth Circuit has made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit to overcome a motion for summary 
judgment. 1 37 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's classification of the Eleventh Cir­
cuit's decision in Howard is also flawed. 1 38 The Eleventh Circuit in Howard 
adopted the requirement that the plaintiff must show only "circumstances 
which give rise to an inference of discrimination." 1 39 Once the Eleventh 
Circuit found the plaintiff had established an inference of discrimination, 
the court examined facts that may act to rule out an established inference 
of discrimination, including the length of time between the plaintiffs ap­
plication for employment and the h i ring of a replacement. 1 40 Therefore, 
the Eleven th Circuit treated the lapse o f  time not as an exception to the 
replacemen t  requirement, but as evidence that may be considered while 
determining if an inference of discrimination was improperly drawn. 1 41 
1 34. Carson, 82 F.3d at 158. 
135. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning uap­
plies equally to in gender or race context: The fact that one person in the pro­
tected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant 
to the prima facie case, so long as she has lost out because of her gender" ) ;  Carson, 
82 F.3d at 1 58 (stating that Suprem e  Court's reasoning is equally applicable to 
Title VII discriminatory discharge cases) .  
136. Compare Brown v. McLean, 1 59 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1 998) (stating age 
discriminatio n  cases are exceptions to non-class replacement requirement) , with 
Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 (applying O'Connor reasoning to Title VII cases and re­
jecting non-class replacement requirement) , and Carson, 82 F.3d at 158 (same) .  
1 37. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 906 (affirming grant o f  summary judgment be­
cause plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement) . 
138. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's flawed reliance on the Eleventh 
Circuit's holding in Howard, see infra notes 1 39-46 and accompanying text. 
139. Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1 53 4  ( 1 1 th Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Jones v. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 ( 5 th Cir. 1982) ; Tex. 
Dep 't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981 ) ) .  
1 40. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 535 (determining whether lapse of time and 
hiring after EEOC filing eliminates inference of discrimination) .  
141.  Compare id. (stating " [t]he hiring . . .  would scarcely rule out the infer­
ence of discrimination in connection with the earlier denial of Howard's applica­
tion") , with Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (stating that generally plaintiffs must show non­
class replacement but exception exists where there is significant time between em­
ployment application and hiring of replacement) . 
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The Fourth Circuit in Brown, however, applied opposite reasoning of 
the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Howard. 1 42 By stating that a plaintiff 
must meet the replacement requirement before a prima facie case of dis­
crimination could be established, the Fourth Circuit limited the situations 
from which discrimination could be inferred. 14� Thus, unlike the Elev­
enth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit began its decision by assuming discrimina­
tion could not be inferred in Brown 's case. 144 Then, instead o f  examining 
the lapse of time to determine if an inference of discrimination could be 
"eliminated," as the Eleventh Circuit did i n  Howard, the Fourth Circuit 
looked at the lapse of time to see if an inference of discrimination could 
be "drawn." 145 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit erred in applying the Elev­
enth Circuit's reasoning in Howard. 146 
The Fourth Circuit also misapplied several circuit courts' reasoning 
that employers may hire another individual from within the protected 
class to disguise discrimination against the plaintiff. 1 47 Federal circuit 
courts that have addressed this possibility have relied on it to support argu­
ments that a plaintiffs replacement should not be considered in deter­
mining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of 
discrimination. 1 48 For example, in Pivirotto, the Third Circuit argued that 
142. For a comparison of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and the Eleventh 
Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 1 43-46 and accompanying text. 
143. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc.,  1 9 1  F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1 999) 
("We can find no justification for limiting the proof necessary to create this infer­
ence [of discrimination] to the potentially irrelevant and only marginally probative 
fact that she was (or was not) replaced by a man." ) .  
144. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905 (stating plaintiffs must show they were re­
placed by someone outside their protected class to make out prima fade case of 
discriminatory discharge) .  
145. Compare id. at 905-06 (stating that there are three exceptions to non-class 
replacement rule and examining length of time to determine if exception could 
be drawn) , with Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 535 (stating that lapse of time would scarcely 
eradicate pre-existing inference of discrimination ) .  
. 146. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's application of Howard 's lapse of 
time argument, see supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text. 
147. See Brown, 1 59 F.2d at 905 (stating that exception may occur when em­
�loyers hire individuals from protected class to mask discrimination against plain­
tiff) . For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's misapplication of the 
argu!°ent that an employer may hire a same-class replacement to avoid a lawsuit, 
see infra notes 1 48-53 and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1 1 26,  1 1 37 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999) (stat­
ing inf17xible rule would preclude suits by employees whose employers replaced 
them with protected class member to avoid law suit) ; Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 
(noti�g employer may replace plaintiff with member of protected class to avoid 
lawsuit); Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (recognizing hiring after claim filed with EEOC 
cannot rule out inference of discrimination) . 
T�e �hird Circuit stated the fact that a plaintiff is replaced by someone within 
the plamtiff's protected class can be explained in many ways. See Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d 
at 355 (rejecting replacement requirement on basis that replacement within class 
do�s no� necessarily indicate that employer did not discriminate) .  Therefore, the 
Third Circuit held that it w?uld be incon.sistent with Title VII to make a plaintiff meet the replacement reqmrement. See id. (same) .  The Third Circuit, however, 
448 V11JANOVA LAw REv11::w [Vol. 46: p. 42 l 
an employer might hire a replacemen t from within the plaintiffs pro­
tected class to hide an act of discrimination and thus avoid a laws uir. 1 ·1!1 In 
addition, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the employer in Hmoard may 
have hired a same-class replacemen t  to avoid a discrim ination suitY'0 
These circuits, h owever, did not recognize that a plaintiff must p rO\·e that 
the employer replaced the plaintiff with a member of the plai n tiffs pro­
tected class to avoid a lawsuit. 1 5 1  In con trast, the Fourth Circuit treats this 
argument as something that the plaintiff must prove before a plaintiffs 
replacement beco m es irrelevant. 1 52 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's require­
ment of proof o f  the employer's intent to mask discrimin ation creates a 
higher obstacle for plaintiffs to overcom e  i n  the prima facie stage than 
that which is applied in other circuit courts. 1 5:� 
The Fourth Circuit failed to recognize other situations in which a 
plaintiff may h ave a meritorious claim of discrim ination even though the 
employer hired a same-class replacement. 154 For example, both the Third 
and Tenth Circuits identified situations where an employe r may disc harge 
an employee based on the employers ' stereotypical images of the employ­
ees' protected class. 155 This possibil ity prompted the Third and Tenth 
Circuits to adopt a lenient approach to the plai ntiffs burden at the prima 
facie stage . 1 56 Under a lenient approach like that adopted in the Tenth 
and Second Circuits, plaintiffs who have meritorious claims are able to 
survive a motion for summary j udgmen t  and the burden shifts to the em-
stated, "The fact that a female plaintiff claiming gender discrimination was re­
placed by another woman might have some evidentiary force , and it would be pru­
dent for a plaintiff in this situation to counter (or explain) such evidence." Id. 
1 49. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (noting that employers may replace plaintiffs 
with members of plaintiffs' protected class to avoid discrimination suit) . 
150. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 535 (recognizing hiring after claim filed with 
EEOC cannot rule out inference of discrimination ) .  
1 5 1 .  See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (failing to recognize that plain tiff must prove 
that employer hired same-class replacement) ; Howard, 726 F.2d at 1 535 (same) .  
152. See Brown, 1 59 F.3d at 905-06 (finding employer did not replace Brown 
with protected individual to hide discrimination ) .  The Fourth Circuit stated, 
"Brown has [not] presented any evidence that the city's hiring of a male for the 
DCS position was designed to hide discrimination against Brown on the basis of his 
gender." Id. at 906. 
153. See McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 ( n oting that courts apply de minimis 
burden on plain tiffs during prim a fade stage) .  
. 154. See Brown_, 1 �9 F.3d �t 905-06 (failing to discuss situations in which plain­tiffs may have mentonous claims and are replaced by individual from within pro­
tected class) . 
155. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1 1 26 ,  1 1 3 7  ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999) (stating that 
employers may fire women who they believe are feminists or fire African-Ameri­
cans �ho do not "know their place") ; Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 (stating employers 
may discharge employees who do not meet employers' stereotypical image ) . 
1 �6. See Perry, 1 99 F.3d �t 1 1 37 (rejecting strict replacement requirement be­
cause It woul.d pr�clu�e me�1torious claims) ;  Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 ( remarking b�cause of s1tuauons m which employers discriminate against plaintiffs but still 
hue same-class replacement for plaintiff, it is i n consistent with Title VII to require 
plaintiff to show n on-class replacement) . 
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ployer to present reasons for the plaintiffs discharge. 1 57 In the Fourth 
Circuit, however, plaintiffs that have meritorious claims, but are replaced 
by an individual from their protected class, would not be able to survive a 
motion for summary judgment. 1 58 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's failure to 
consider the possibility that plaintiffs may be discriminated against despite 
the fact that their employers hired a same-class replacement results in the 
unjust dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims. 1 59 
3. Failure to Address Underlying Policy Possibly Undermines Decision 
Furthermore, in reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit failed to 
consider the purpose of the prima facie case, which is to "eliminate the 
most obvious, lawful reasons for the defendant's action. " 1 60 For example, 
in Perry, the Tenth Circuit examined the purpose of the prima facie case 
and found that an inference of discrimination is raised when a plaintiff 
eliminates the two most common reasons for termination: "lack of qualifi­
cation or the elimination of the job. " 1 6 1 Federal courts, including the 
Tenth Circuit in Perry, also have noted that elimination of the plain tiffs 
position does not prevent a plaintiff from establishing a prima fade 
case. 1 62 Thus, if the Fourth Circuit had applied the reasoning of the 
Tenth Circuit and of other federal courts, Brown's claim would have most 
likely survived the city's motion for summary judgment by simply showing 
that the city sought applicants for the Director of Communications Ser­
vices position . 163 
157. See, e.g., Perry, 1 99 F.3d at 1 1 40 ( stating that after plaintiffs raise inference 
of discrimination burden shifts to employer to dispel inference of discrimination).  
1 58. See, e.g., Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (listing examples where plaintiffs may 
have meritorious claims but are replaced by members of their protected class) ;  
McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 (stating plaintiffs burden at prima facie stage was 
intended to be de minimis but courts tend to use prima facie case to defeat plain­
tiffs' claims) . 
159. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's failure to recognize situations in 
which plaintiffs may have meritorious claims, but are replaced by someone from 
the plaintiffs protected class, see supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. 
. 160. Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 351 .  In Pivirotto, the Third Circuit stated that requir­
mg a plaintiff to show non-class replacement did not eliminate common, lawful 
reasons for the plaintiffs discharge. See id. (stating that requiring plaintiff to show 
man replaced her did not eliminate common, lawful reasons for discharge) .  The 
Third Circuit distinguished situations in which a plaintiff could not prove that he 
�r she was qualified for the position and stated that in these situations the plain­
ll�s case should fail because the plaintiff failed to eliminate a lawful reason for the 
discharge. See id. (distinguishing failure to show qualification for job from failure 
to show non-class replacement) . 
161.  See Perry, 1 99 F.3d at 1 140. 
162. See id. at 1 140 n.10 (noting elimination of job does not necessarily elimi­
nate.discrimination claim) ;  accord Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985) (s�tmg t�at elimination of position should not prevent plaintiff from establishing 
pnma facie case) . 
. 163. See gen eraUy Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (noting that simply ap­p�ymg McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII cases would allow discriminatory 
discharge claims to survive summary judgment) . 
450 Vn .r ANOVA LAw REvmw [Vol. 46: p. 4� 1 
In additio n ,  the Fourth Circuit did not address the manner i n  which 
the prima facie elements were intended to be applied. 1 i;4 As the Second 
Circuit recognized in Meiri, the elements of proof in an employment dis­
crimination case "were not intended to be ' rigid, mechanized or ritualis­
tic. ' " 165 Instead, the elements of proof were only intended to make the 
plaintiff "carry t h e  initial burden of offering evidence adequate to ' raise [ ] 
an inference o f  discrimination. "' 1 66 Additionally, courts have recognized 
that a plai ntiff's burden at the prima facie stage is de mi nimis. 1 m  Circuit 
courts that have addressed the flexibility of the prima facie case and the 
plaintiffs de minimis burden have tended to adopt a more lenient ap­
proach than the strict approach that the Fourth Circuit applies. 1 1)8 The 
Fourth Circuit 's  adoption of a rigid rul e  that plaintiffs must show non-class 
replacement con travenes the purpose of the prima facie case . rnu If the 
Fourth Circuit would have applied a more lenient approach l i ke other 
circuit courts, Brown may have been able to establish a prima facie case by 
showing that the city sought a replacement. 1 70 Then Brown would have 
met his de m i n imis burden, and the burden would have s h i fted to the 
Id. 
A simple adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas elements in the disc harge 
arena serves the purposes originally envisioned by the [Supreme] Court, 
by protecting claims with merit from automatic dismissal, while allowing 
claims based on thin evidence to be later disposed of at stage three, 
where the ultimate issue of discrimination is considered. 
164. See Brown v. McLean, 1 59 F.3d 898, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1 998) (failing to 
address purpose of prima facie case) .  
1 65. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 ( 2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.  567, 577 ( 1978) ) .  
1 66. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 ) .  
167. See id. a t  996 ( noting that prima fade e lements were only intended to 
make plaintiff carry initial burden and were not intended to be inflexible ) ;  see also 
Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (stating that Supreme Court did not intend 
plaintiffs "prima facie burden to be onerous") .  
168. See, e.g. , Perry v. Woodward, 1 99 F.3d 1 1 26, 1 1 37 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999) ("The 
imposition of the inflexible rule . . .  is untenable because it could result in the 
dismissal of meritorious claims.") ; Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (noting flexibility of prima 
facie elements and finding that plaintiff must only raise inference of 
discrimination) . 
1 69. See generally Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (stating that because elements of proof 
were intended to be flexible, imposition of non-class replacement requirement on 
plaintiffs contravenes policies underlying Title VII) .  
170. See, e.g. , Perry, 1 99 F.3d at 1 1 39 (noting that requiring plaintiff to show 
employer continued to seek applicants is superior standard to those followed in 
?ther c.ou:ts) ;  Smith v. F.W. Morse & <:o., 76 F.3d 4 1 3, 421 ( 1 st Cir. 1 996) ( requir-1?g pla�ntiff to show �eplacement continued to perform plaintiff's work after plain­
tiff's discharge) ;  Mein, 759 . F.�d at 996 ( requiring plaintiffs to show employer sought replacement for plamt1ff) ; Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 
1072, 1075 (?t� Cir. 1 986) (requiring plaintiffs to show employer sought replace­
ment for plamuff) . 
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defendants to provide a non-discri minatory reason for Brown 's 
tennination. 1 71 
V. IMPACT OF FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN BROWN V. McLE.·\N 
Although the Fourth Circuit treated Brown 's discriminatory discharge 
claim as a minor and insignificant contention, the court created a prece­
dent for its application in subsequent discriminatory discharge cases. 1 7'2 
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown, however, is vastly inconsistent with 
recent federal decisions. 1 73 In fact, the Fourth Circuit is the only federal 
circuit court of appeals to adopt a strict approach, which automatically 
precludes a plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory 
discharge if the plaintiff fails to show non-class replacement. 1 74 The result 
is an unequal and inconsistent application of Title VII among federal cir­
cuit courts. 1 75 This inconsistency will hopefully prompt the Supreme 
Court to clarify the proper elements of the discriminatory discharge prima 
facie case. 176 
Furthermore, by adopting a strict view of the fourth element of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, the Fourth Circuit may be precluding plain­
tiffs who have meritorious claims from obtaining a just result. 1 77 Many 
circuits have recognized that an employer may have discriminated against 
the plaintiff even though the employer replaced the plaintiff with a mem­
ber of the plaintiff's protected class. 1 78 This recognition is consistent with 
171 .  See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (stating that simple adaptation of 
prima facie elements allows plaintiffs to survive motion for summary judgment and 
burden then shifts to defendant) . 
172. See, e.g., Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 98-1 1 65,  1 999 WL 
507137, at *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (applying Brown holding to discriminatory 
discharge prima facie case) . 
173. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Corp., 220 F.3d 1 229 ( 1 0th Cir. 
2000) (adopting lenient approach to replacement requirement) ; Perry, 1 99 F.3d at 
1 138 (same) ;  Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys. ,  Inc., 1 99 F.3d 344, 355 ( 3d Cir. 1 999) 
(same). 
174. See Pivirotto, 1 99 F.3d at 354 n.6 (noting that Fourth Circuit is only fed­
eral circuit court of appeals to adopt strict non-class replacement approach )  . 
. 
175. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 487 ( no ting confusion for litigants of 
varymg approaches to prima fade case) .  
176. See, e.g. ,  O' Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 1 7  U . S. 308, 309 
(1996) (granting certiorari to determine whether ADEA plaintiff must show non­
class replacement) ; Chappel, supra note 55, at 2 1 1 - 1 2  (noting split among circuits 
?Ver �eplacement requirement in ADE.A cases prior to Supreme Court's decision 
m 0 Con:iar) ! see also
. 
Cl�ck-�re�man, supra note 6, at 487-88 (noting confusion 
ar:io�g circmt:' and w1thm orcmts over replacement requirement in Title VII dis­
cnmmatory discharge cases) . 
1 77. See'. e.g., Perry, 1�9. F.3d at 1 1 37 (stating that employers may fire women who they beheve are femm1sts or fire African-Americans who do not "know their 
place") ;  Pivirotto, 1 9 1  F.3d at 355 (stating employers may discharge employees who 
do not meet employers' stereotypical image) .  
178. For a discussion of circuits that recognize that plaintiffs may be dismissed 
although they have meritorious claims, see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying 
text. 
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the plain tiffs de minimis burden at the prima fac ie stage. 1 7'' The Fourth 
Circuit's approach ,  however, raises the bar that plaintiffs must overcome 
to survive a defendant's motion for sum mary judgmen t. 1 Ho In the Fourth 
Circuit, and in courts adopting the Fourth Circuit's approach , plain tiffs 
who may have been discriminated against but who were replaced by a 
member of their protected class will be excluded from having their day in 
court. 181  This result contravenes the u nderlying purpose of Title VII-to 
protect individuals from employment d iscrimination . 1 H� 
Christina M. Sautter 
179. For a discussion of the underlying policies of the prima facie ca.�e. see 
supra notes 1 60-71 and accompanying text. 
180. See McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 (stating burden at prima facie stage 
was intended to be de minimis but courts o f  appeals now use prima facie stage to 
defeat plain tiffs' claims) . 
1 8 1 .  Contra Clack-Freeman, supra note 6 ,  at 49 1 (stating that lenient approach 
protects claims with merit from automatic dismissal ) .  
1 82. See 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) ( 1 995) (prohibiting discrimination i n  employ­
ment arena which is based on sex, religion, race, color and national origi n ) .  
